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Summary findings
Malaysian authorities implemented controls on  and the authorities made good use of this time,
international capital flows late in the Asian crisis, when  stabilizing the financial system and pushing ahead with
most of the portfolio outflows had already occurred. The  regulatory and supervisory reform for the financial sector
exchange rate had depreciated sharply and was fixed at  and capital markets-a  prerequisite for fully liberalizing
an undervalued level, making further capital flight  the capital account.
unlikely.  Malaysia incurred a cost: an additional 300 basis point
The turnaround  in the stock market, the return of  spread paid on floating rate debt for a period after the
positive GDP growth, the building of reserves, and the  controls were instituted. But the exit strategy has so far
relaxation of interest rates all coincided with the  not resulted in lasting flight of portfolio capital. Foreign
imposition of controls. But the same changes took place  direct investment remains below precrisis levels, but it is
in other crisis countries that did not follow the same  not possible at this stage to attribute this to the effect of
control policies.  controls.
However, the controls provided insurance against the  On balance, it appears that both the benefits from and
consequences of possible further  disturbances. They  the costs of the controls have been modest.
created a breathing space for making needed reforms,
This paper-a  product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, East Asia and Pacific Region-
is part of a larger effort in the region to help reestablish growth in the postcrisis period. Copies of the paper are available
free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Hedwig Abbey, room MC8-150,
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The trend in the recent past has been towards liberalization of capital markets motivated
by a desire for economic efficiency: the free cross border flow of capital seeking the
highest rate of return results in its most efficient use. Controls on capital flows mean that
both borrower and  lender forego potential gains. The use  of controls is  sometimes
justified using second best arguments related to market imperfections  such as asymmetric
information. More frequently, however, controls are used for reasons that relate to the
classic  policy  dilemma  stating  that  one  cannot  simultaneously have  free  capital
movement, a fixed exchange rate and an independent  monetary policy. By controlling
capital movement authorities are free to set interest rates in line with domestic needs
while enjoying the stability afforded  by a fixed exchange rate. Speculative  pressures that
would  otherwise  necessitate sharp  defensive moves  in  domestic interest  rates  (or
precipitate large exchange rate movements under a flexible rate regime) can be contained
by elimination  or containment  of the capital flows themselves.
Controls can be on inflows or outflows. Inflow controls are most conmmonly  used in the
context of a speculative bubble. They free the authorities from the need for large scale
sterilization  to counter inflationary  pressures  created by the inflows, and they mitigate the
distortionary effect that the exchange rate appreciation will have on external trade and
production. In addition, large inflows of short term capital distort the maturity structure
of  debt  and  strain the  capacity of  the  domestic financial  system to  intermediate
efficiently. This problem is most acute when regulatory and supervisory systems are
weak. Controls were used  in this  context in  Malaysia (1994), Chile (1991-98) and
Thailand  (1995-97).  Controls  on  outflows  are  more  commonly  associated  with  a
speculative collapse and currency crisis as was the case in Malaysia (1998-99), Spain
(1992) and Thailand (1997-99).  In these countries the capital account had previously
been largely liberalized. The controls were adopted when there was strong speculative
pressure against the currency, declining reserves and domestic interest rates had already
been raised to levels that were further weakening already depressed domestic demand.
Market-base controls rely on special taxes, non-interest bearing deposit requirements or
dual exchange rate systems. These types of controls serve to raise the cost of specific
capital account transactions and thereby discourage flows. They have been used to
control both  inflows and outflows, and they are most commonly applied to counter
foreign speculation. Administrative controls involve limits or bans particular capital
account transactions and are usually administered  through the banking system. One of the
most common is a ban on currency swap transactions.  Capital controls are closely linked
with exchange control measures as is the case with the swap controls and the two-tier
exchange systems. Authorities have sometimes sought to  limit  offshore trading  of
domestic currency  (Malaysia and  Thailand) and  equity  (Malaysia) as  a  means  of
containing  speculative pressure during the control period.3
Malaysian Experience Before the Crisis
Since floating the ringgit in 1973 Malaysia began a steady process of liberalizing capital
account transactions. A major relaxation in  1987-89 was accompanied by  steps to
deregulate the financial system. However, in the early 1990s Malaysia experienced a
surge of short- and long-term capital inflows. While the long-term flows were related to
strong economic fundamentals, the  short-term flows were  drawn by  high  domestic
interest rates which the authorities felt necessary  to contain inflation.  The inflows, which
resulted in a  sharp build up of debt securities and external liabilities in the banking
system, were regarded as  dangerously reversible. Sterilization operations were both
expensive and ineffective since they kept interest rates up. After a series of increases in
reserve requirements and fearing loss of control of the monetary base, BNM imposed
several direct and market-based controls on capital inflows in February 1994. These
included limits on sale of short term securities to non-residents, speculative swaps and
forward transactions, and banks' non-trade-related  external liabilities, and a requirement
for non-interest-bearing deposits against foreign bank ringgit accounts with domestic
banks. The reaction was swift. The stock market underwent a correction, and a sharp
reversal in short term flows in the second half of 1994 caused the capital account surplus
to shrink. The controls were dismantled by the end of the year. The control measures
were thus effective, although the ending of sterilization operations and the reduction in
the interest differential also helped inhibit the inflows.
With  the  passing  of  this  episode  Malaysia  resumed  its  policy  of  progressive
liberalization. As of 1997 the authorities allowed trade payments to be made in ringgit,
financial transactions  with  non-residents were  subject to  few  limitations, portfolio
inflows were  unrestricted and portfolio outflows were  subject to  ceilings  only  for
corporate residents that had  borrowed domestically. Supplier credit to  non-residents
could be extended for up to 6 months without limitation. Approval was required for
primary issuance of  securities by non-residents and issuance of securities abroad by
residents, but banks could borrow abroad and could lend foreign exchange to residents
and non-residents, although foreign currency borrowing by residents required approval
above certain  amounts. Foreign  direct  investment, both  inward  and  outward,  was
completely free except for some sectoral limitations.  (see Table 1 for details)
With this  freedom there evolved an  active offshore market  for  the ringgit  located
primarily in Singapore  but with trading also taking place in London, New York and Hong
Kong. This market was attractive because spreads tended to  be narrower than in the
domestic market in part because participants were not subject to the same high reserve
ratio that BNM required of onshore institutions. The market consisted of all transactions
outside Malaysia involving ringgit on one  side or other including currency trading,
deposit taking, lending and trade in derivatives such as  swap contracts and options.
External trade transactions could be denominated  and settled in ringgit. This removed the
need for Malaysian exporters  and importers to hedge the foreign exchange risk. However,
the foreign trade partners had to  hedge their ringgit risk and they did  so with such
instruments as swap contracts and options offered through the offshore market. Besides
offering efficient trade and hedging opportunities the offshore market provided a means
of establishing a benchmark yield curve for Malaysia.  This is important for allowing
both foreign and domestic investors to efficiently price risk of Malaysian securities and4
contributes the development  of the private debt securities market which continues to be a
key objective in Malaysia' capital market development  program.I
The bulk of  offshore trade was made possible by the  system of external accounts
consisting of ringgit deposits of foreign banks held with resident Malaysian banks. The
deposits in the external accounts represent the ringgit under the control of foreigners and
are foreign liabilities of the banking system. Offshore  transactions, whether for trade or
speculative purposes ultimately have to be settled by transfers between these external
accounts. Those wanting to speculate against the ringgit could do so through the offshore
market.  Basically speculators want to have ringgit liabilities. For instance they might
borrow ringgit now from their offshore bank with repayment due in ringgit at a future
date. The speculator's bank could accommodate this demand, by hedging its ringgit
exposure. It might do so by entering a swap agreement to  lay off the currency risk.
Alternatively, it could draw funds from its external  account to advance to the client. This
creates offsetting changes in ringgit assets and liabilities. Equivalently it might borrow
ringgit from its  correspondent bank in  Malaysia or  increase rates to  attract ringgit
deposits thereby creating a ringgit liability to offset the ringgit asset it holds in the form
of a loan to its client. 2 Whatever  the hedging mechanism  the net effect of the speculation
is to increase the demand for ringgit credit, increase short term interest rates and put
forward pressure on the currency.
The Crisis
I and _  _  _lMalaysia  had several economic
Nomnal  and  Effectwe  E)change  Rates  I  strengths going into the crisis. In
150  ............  ......  ................................... 6.....  ........  I - June 1997,  the ringgit  w  as trading
125  at 2.52 to the U.S. dollar, and had
been  close  to  that  value  since
real  '~'~;e~'effecumthe  rate  /\J\4  January  1995.  Inflation  was
75  .. . . . - 3  D  running  at an annual  rate  of 2.2%.
0>  2  1  The real  effective exchange rate
nomrictrtinal  rate  2  had appreciated somewhat over
25  (tighltscae)  1  the longer term but was only about
0  o  _  _  8 percent above its 1995 level and
19L  19I  1997  19%  19%  was declining. Foreign exchange
I  -----.---  ____  .<  reserves were USD 27 billion or
about 26% percent of GDP and had been steady in this range for over a year.  External
debt at the end of 1996 was 31% of GDP down slightly from levels of the previous three
years. Short term debt was only a quarter of total debt.
' A riskless benchmark yield allows market participants  to observe risk premia for private issues. The
return on (close to riskless) Malaysian  Government  Securities (MGS) does not provide such a benchmark
because the MGS yield is depressed by the captive demand  created for MGS generated  by reserve
requirements and MGS holdings required of the state pension fund. Swap prices can be used to translate
(riskless) US treasury yields into ringgit  yields which provide  the necessary  benchmark.
2 Typically banks that are active internationally  open reciprocal accounts for the clearance  of  letters of
credit and the like. There is often an understanding  that certain balances will be maintained in such
"vostro" accounts in order to facilitate  transactions  and there may be further arrangements  for automatic
extension of local currency credit often backed by securities  denominated  in local currency.5
However, there were some indications of weakness.  The current account was in deficit.
Domestic  credit  growth  had  reached  36%  annually  and  was  accelerating.  Credit
expansion to the property sector was increasing at 30% a  year contributing to  asset
inflation. Shares on the KLSE rose by 24.4% in 1996 and reached a three-year high in
February 1997. Stocks on the second board rose 93% in 1996 reaching a peak in March
1997 with a PE ratio of 58.
Initially,  selective  credit  controls  were  introduced  to  counter  asset  price
inflation.  During the first half of 1997 BNM was concerned that the wealth effects of
the asset price rise, combined with strong credit expansion would contribute to inflation
and increased vulnerability of the banking system to any drop in demand. Accordingly,
the authorities imposed ceilings of 15% and 20% respectively for bank credit secured by
property and stock. BNM disseminated information on the over-supply of office and
retail space in order to cool demand. BNM basically hoped to contain pressures via the
credit ceilings. The sense was that the productive sectors were not over extended like the
property and stock markets, and that high interest rates would be damaging.
.....  and  then  interest rates were  hiked to  defend the  ringgit  ......  With  the
devaluation of the Thai bhat in July, strong pressures began to build against the ringgit.
Portfolio positions in the stock market were liquidated causing the KLSE to  plunge.
BNM intervened in the foreign exchange market buying up ringgit and reducing liquidity
and causing rates on overnight money in the interbank market to spike up to 40%. Thus
the authorities initially attempted to defend the ringgit through interest rate hikes. But the
persistence of  the  exchange rate pressures and  the  floating of the  Philippine peso
indicated that the instability would be longer term and that a protracted period of high
interest rates might be necessary.
......  which lead to a rise in NPLs..... NPLs began to increase in the latter part of 1997
and accelerated in 1998 as the economy contracted. The situation was worst among the
finance companies which held just under a quarter of all loans and had expanded most
aggressively in real estate and share purchase lending. The NPLs continued to mount and
began affecting the commercial and merchant banks as well. As financial institutions
became more preoccupied with NPLs, loan loss provisions and capital adequacy, the
volume of lending began to slow. Credit worthiness  of some borrowers was impaired by
the higher interest rates and the contraction  in demand, leading to fears of a credit crunch.
Among other borrowers the demand for credit simply declined in line with sales. By early
1998 the authorities main concern was that credit expansion would be insufficient to
sustain recovery.
. ... and eventually capital controls. Net flows of portfolio capital had been positive on
an annual basis since 1992. On the tide of speculative pressure, net outflows of RM10
billion emerged in the first three quarters of 1997. On August 4, 1997  BNM imposed a $2
million limit on domestic bank's offer side swaps with non-residents  in an effort to stem
the speculative flows. This had only a modest effect in slowing the exodus of capital. As
outlined above, there are several channels for speculative activity and the swap limits
served only to put  a wedge between domestic and offshore ringgit interest rates. By
August 1998 interest rates on offshore ringgit deposits rose to more than 20% compared6
with 11.4% rates on deposits in Malaysian Banks. The ringgit which had slid by 4.2% in
July 1998 dropped a further 12.4% in August. Fearing an acceleration of capital flight
and pressure on domestic interest rates, on September 1, 1998 BMN imposed a package
of capital account regulations.
The Imposition of Capital Controls
The capital controls were complex and comprehensive.  Basically they sought to eliminate
the opportunity for taking speculative positions against the ringgit by eliminating all
international financial  transactions not  related to  underlying trade  and  FDI.  They
effectively closed the offshore market, cut off ringgit credit to foreigners and put a
moratorium on portfolio outflows. The details of this regulations appear in Tables I and 2
but the main elements were as follows.
1.  A one  year waiting period imposed on repatriation of  the proceeds of  sales of
Malaysian securities held in external accounts.
2.  Mandatory  repatriation of all ringgit held abroad.
3.  Restriction on transfers of funds between external accounts.
4.  Limits on transport of ringgit by travellers.
5.  Prohibition of resident/non-resident  credit arrangements.
6.  Prohibition of  trade settlement in ringgit.
7.  Prohibition of resident/non-resident  offer side swaps and similar hedge transactions.
8.  Freezing of CLOB share transactions.
On February 15, 1999 the one year waiting period on portfolio capital outflows was
replaced with a set of graduated exit taxes. The basic arrangement was to distinguish
repatriation of  principal from  repatriation of  profits,  and  investment made  before
February 14, 1999 from that made after. For investments  made prior to February 14 1999,
principal was to be taxed at a declining  rate and would cease to attract any levy after one
year from  its  time  of entry or from  September 1  1998 which  ever was later. For
investments  made after February 14, 1999 there was no tax on principal. For investments
made before February  14, 1999, profits would be taxed at zero if  repatriated before
September 1, 1999 and at 10 percent thereafter. For investments band after February 14,
1999 profits would be taxed at 30% falling to  10% if held for one year or more. On
September 21, 1999 a further adjustment  was made to exempt investments made between
September 1 1998 and February 14, 1999 from the 10% exit levy on principal.
The immediate objective of the control policies was to stem the speculative pressure on
the ringgit, and to provide stability through moderation of domestic interest rates and a
pegged exchange rate. These policies were regarded as temporary measures. In part they
were seen as insulating the economy from an external shock and the contagion effects of
the financial crisis in neighboring countries. It was recognized that there were some
structural weaknesses in the Malaysian  financial and corporate sectors that would have to
be addressed in medium term. The capital controls seen as providing a breathing space
during which the authorities could launch programs to deal with these problems and help
restore confidence  and reduce balance of payments  pressures.7
BNM administered the controls through the banks. Its historically tight control over the
banking system with frequent reporting intervals and on site supervision made it possible
for them to ensure strict compliance. Clear documentary evidence was required for all
international financial transactions clearly linking the transaction to underlying trade or
foreign direct investment. The complexity of the controls caused some confusion at the
outset. However, BNM conducted an effective information campaign placing detailed
descriptions of the control measures before the public including postings on its web site.
Over time it provided updates, clarifications and worked examples detailing how the
controls  were to be applied to a variety of transactions.
Events Following the Imposition of Controls
Thee  ra-Ra Rg'  The  capital  controls  had  several
%l2o  s,a"dXntSs  immediate  effects.  First,  the
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[  lm  -- T--,  19-  7  ,,  was  also  careful  to  identify  and
close off virtually all other channels
i __________  _____________________-  I  J  for  speculative  capital  outflows
including the freezing of trade in CLOB shares 3, amendment of the Companies Act to
prevent  dividend  distributions, and  withdrawal of  large  denomination notes  from
circulation.
The interest rate changes were closely coordinated  with the introduction of the controls.
The 3-month interbank rate which is BNM's policy rate had been hiked in stages from
7.6% in September 1997 to  11.0% in February 1998 as part of the initial monetary
tightening strategy. It  stayed in  this range until August 1998. As  the controls were
introduced and it became clear that the offshore market had been effectively shut down,
BNM gained confidence that they had  successfully reversed the globalization of the
ringgit and began to relaxed interest rates. The 3-month interbank rate fell to  7.75 in
September. Further cuts were made in April 1999, and by end 1999 the rate was 3.15%.
Inflation (CPI) which was 5.6% in August remained on a steady downward  trend to 2.5%
by end 1999. The banks' base lending rate is linked to the interbank rate and the banks
were required to reduce the maximum margin over the base lending rate from 4 to 2.5
percentage points with effect from September 14. As a result bank and finance company
lending rates at the fell by 4-5% over the last half of 1998, although the cap on lending
spreads limits the ability of financial institutions  to efficiently price risk. Banks were also
3Singapore  investors  were unable  to dispose of an estimated  4.9 billion dollars worth of CLOB shares and
this remained a source of irritation  until it was resolved in February  2000 when the Singapore and Kuala
Lumpur exchanges came to agreement  on the registration  and phased release of the shares through the
Malaysian Central Depository.8
encouraged to achieve a the minimum target of 8% loan growth. The statutory reserve
requirement was reduced in several rounds from  13.5% in February 1998 to 4% by
September 14.
The September 1 announcement of capital controls coincided with the stock market low
of 262. From there the market rose steadily for six months to over 600.
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The  current  account  continued to  strengthen and  with  the  controls  on  outflows,
international reserves which had been equal to 3.3 months of imports in the first quarter
of 1998 jumped sharply to 4.3 and then 5.7 months of imports in the third and fourth
quarters  respectively.
Rtegional  Reactions to the Crisis
NominalExchang  RatesIt  is important to place these events
Jan  1997=100  in the context of the developments  in
the  region as  a whole. Despite its
120  . . _-.-_.  sharply  different  policy  on  capital
100  controls, the pattern of the recovery
>  ~~~~~~~~~~in  Malaysia is very similar to that of
80  it-ai  Phili  pnos  Kraother  countries  of  the  region.  In
60  Malaysia,  Korea,  Thailand,
40  >  Indonesia, and to a lesser extent the
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20  '  \,  rmdaqesia  ~~contractions  starting  in  the  last
o  ~~~~~~~~~~~quarter  of 1997 lead to a buildup of
1997  1998  1909  reserves  and  greater  confidence  in
regional  currencies.  Nominal
exchange rates of these countries all  bottomed out near the beginning of  1998 and
stabilized by Q3, allowing monetary loosening and relaxation of interest rates. The
recovery of  GDP growth began in  Q2. 1998 in  Korea and  Thailand, in  Q3 in  the
Philippines and Malaysia and in Q4 in Indonesia,  following fiscal stimulus applied in all
of the countries in 1998, and expanded in 1999.  The similarity of these developments  and
the close timing of  the changes in  the different countries makes it very difficult to
attribute a significant and distinct role to the Malaysian exchange controls in bringing9
about  recovery,  despite the  fact  that  their  imposition coincides  roughly  with  the
tumaround in Malaysia's economic  performance  in Q3 1998.
Thailand also imposed capital controls, but it did so in May 1997,  17 months before
Malaysia and removed them again after only eight months. They were introduced at the
height of the speculative attack on the baht when there was heavy demand for baht credit.
Borrowed baht were converted into foreign exchange in anticipation of a devaluation,
putting downward pressure on the exchange rate and draining reserves. The controls were
effective in shutting down the swap market domestic banking system sources of baht
credit, and creating large losses for speculators. The capital controls were not as tightly
enforced as  in  Malaysia, however, and  alternative channels for  baht outflows were
exploited to  arbitrage the gap between onshore and offshore borrowing rates which
widened to 12.9% in early June 1997.  These outflows continued to drain reserves and the
central bank eventually let the baht float on July 2 1997. The baht fell more than 50
percent by time the controls  were lifted in January of 1998. It then appreciated  by roughly
30 percent and stabilized at that level within four months. The realignment of the baht
was critical in defusing the external pressure. The launching of financial and corporate
restructuring efforts and other structural reforms were necessary to re-establish sufficient
confidence to allow interest rates to decline. If anything it was the removal of controls in
January that contributed to building this confidence.  Basically, Thailand used controls to
defend a fixed and overvalued exchange rate but could not, and eventually had to give up.
In Malaysia the ringgit was under a managed float.  Like Thailand its exchange rate
depreciated by 80 percent in the seven months ending January 1998. As the government
launched comprehensive  restructuring  programs in the corporate and financial sectors the
currency began to strengthen. There were advances and retreats but by September 1998
the exchange rate had appreciated  by 20 percent from its January low. Only then were the
Malaysian capital controls imposed and the exchange rate pegged. In Korea there was a
progressive loosening capital account restrictions from 1987 on but the regime was less
liberal than either Thailand or Malaysia. Offshore trading was limited and with flexible
exchange rates and high interest rate policy, speculative activity against the won was
minimal during the  crisis. Korea made no adjustments to the capital control system
focussing instead on corporate and financial sector reforms. These events point to the
importance of establishing credible structural reform programs as well as flexibility in
exchange adjustment as key to recovery and the return to stable growth. The fact that
capital control policies were not adjusted in the other countries of the region, save in
Thailand where they were lifted some eight months prior to the recovery, suggests that at
most they may have been of use as a short term stabilization  device.
Costs and Benefits of Controls
In retrospect one can see that Malaysia's controls and exchange peg came when the worst
of the crisis had  passed, but it as of mid-1998 it was not  at all clear that regional
economic disturbances had  settled. The Malaysian policies  therefore did  provide  a
safeguard against further turbulence in international capital flows and financial markets
and the authorities made effective use the breathing space afforded by the controls to
launch the  structural reforms necessary for longer term growth. These included the
establishment of Danamodal to recapitalize banks, and Danaharta to carve out NPLs and10
begin  corporate  and  financial  restructuring.  Bankruptcy  laws  and  courts  were
modernized, a major corporate governance drive was launched and a comprehensive
program of banking sector supervision and regulation  was begun. In these areas Malaysia
has made greater progress than many of its neighbors. The absence of a counterfactual
makes it difficult to determine whether these reforms might have made as quickly or
deeply in the absence of capital controls but the controls arguably provided a margin of
safety by insulating the economy from potential further shocks so that these critical
programs could be launched with confidence.
r  Sovereign  Spreads  There  are  several Sovereign  Spreads
and  Capital  Controls  potential  costs  to  the
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instruments increased to 1000 basis points from less than 50 basis points prior to the
crisis. Spreads for almost all developing countries increased sharply after the Russian
default in August of 1998.  But the Malaysian spread  jumped about 300 basis points more
than the spreads for Thailand, Korea and the Philippines. The subsequent decline in the
Malaysian spread also lagged that of the other countries  by about two months.
Foreign direct  investment flows dropped  substantially in  1998 and  1999 and  have
remained weak in 2000 as well. However, the excessive  rates of pre-crisis investment  and
the emergence and continuing presence of excess capacity throughout the region mean
that it is too early to tell whether the controls have had (or will have) an independent
depressing effect on FDI.
A second problem with controls concerns the exit strategy. From the beginning it was
announced that the Malaysian controls were to be temporary, in part to minimize the
impact on investor sentiment and the country risk premium. The relaxation of capital
controls in February was partly a signaling device to reinforce in the public mind that the
controls were temporary. Fears that capital would flee as the exit ban was replaced with
exit taxes proved unfounded as very  small outflows were recorded in February and
March, and there were net inflows in April through July  despite further announced
reductions in exit taxes in April and again in June. The elimination of exit taxes on
repayments of principle in September resulted in modest outflow of only about US$300
million. Outflows were anticipated  in the stock market, and the KLSE index which had
been on a strong upward trend from early April, fell by more than 20 percent between
mid-July and early September. By early October the situation had stabilized, and net
inflows were recorded in each month from November 1999 through February 2000.11
It is important to keep the magnitude of these numbers in perspective. Net flows in the
control period and its aftermath  were very small compared with RM 10 billion that left in
1997 at the height of the crisis. The decline in the stock market was short lived and not
that large in the context of the massive swings of the recent past.
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The passing of September 1, 1999 did not signal the complete end of controls. There
remains the 10% exit tax on profits making Malaysia less attractive to investors relative
to most other middle income countries 4. Removal of this tax should have a positive effect
on foreign investment as well as simplifying the system. 5 However, the rate is low and
although it involves some compliance  costs its applicability  has been narrowed to exclude
real estate, second board stocks and certain other items.
Resident investors must still obtain approval for investment abroad exceeding 10,000
ringgit and  there are limits on  the import and export of  ringgit notes. In  addition,
restrictions on swap transactions and on credit transactions between residents and non-
residents as well as the requirement that trade be invoiced in foreign currency have been
retained. Relaxation of these controls should be done in a carefully sequenced manner.
The substantial programs now underway for improving the financial sector regulatory
and supervisory framework should be suitably advanced especially in regard to the risks
associated with cross-border transactions as capital account reforms are introduced. A
consistent monetary policy and exchange regime should be in place. In this regard the
authorities have indicated their intention to maintain the peg for the time being. Some
change might be necessary fairly soon, however. At present the ringgit is undervalued
raising the risk of an inward surge of short term capital in anticipation of an exchange
rate adjustment. Currently BNM is  sterilizing inflows and  accumulating reserves. It
would be best if the shift to a more flexible exchange regime could be made before these
pressures build and complicate  the process of liberalizing  capital account  transactions.
4 In particular there are no exit taxes in Indonesia, Thailand, China, Korea or the Philippines.  Most
countries  other than Indonesia  and the Philippines  apply income  taxes to interest, dividends,  profits and
capital gains However, unlike the exit taxes these taxes  would be generate tax credits in the investors'
home jurisdiction.
5 The exit tax was modified in the 2000/2001 budget introduced  on October 27, 2000 and will not be
applied to capital gains on assets held for more than one year.12
Summary
Controls were implemented  late in the evolution of the crisis. The bulk of the portfolio
outflows were already over. The exchange rate had depreciated sharply and was fixed at
an undervalued level making further capital flight unlikely. The turnaround in the stock
market the return of positive GDP growth, the building of reserves and the relaxation of
interest rates were all coincident with the imposition of controls. But these changes are
found in all the other crisis countries, and they did not follow the same control policies.
However, the controls provided insurance against the consequences of possible further
disturbances. They created a  breathing space for making necessary reforms and  the
authorities made good use of this time. The stabilization  of the financial system through
Danaharta and Danamodal was quick and complete. Throughout the control period the
authorities have pushed ahead with regulatory and supervisory reform for the financial
sector  and  capital  markets  - an  important prerequisite  for  full  capital  account
liberalization.
The controls were fully effective in achieving the immediate goal of closing offshore
market. This helped create the scope for lowering domestic interest rates. This eased the
buildup of NPLs  in the financial system and insulated domestic firms from potential
shocks of a further spike in interest rates and volatility of exchange rates.
The evidence presented here suggests that Malaysia may have incurred a cost in terms of
the additional 300 basis point spread paid on floating rate debt after the controls were
instituted and that this effect persisted over a period of about six months.  There do not
appear to have been serious attempts  to circumvent  the controls so that any damage to the
integrity of the marketplace  has been minimal.  The exit strategy has so far not resulted in
lasting capital flight of portfolio capital. FDI remains below pre-crisis levels but it is not
possible at this stage to attribute  this to the effect of controls.
No attempt has been made to measure the compliance and administrative costs of the
controls. It is clear however that BNM made the strongest possible effort to disseminate
information  about the controls  and to clarify misunderstandings.  The preannouncement  of
the end of controls including the system of graduated exit taxes helped to give market
participants a clear picture of what future changes could be expected.
The current undervaluation  of the ringgit argues for an early move towards exchange rate
flexibility which would help to smooth the way for capital account liberalization although
this needs to be coordinated  with progress on financial market supervision and regulation.
On balance it appears that the controls had a modest cost that was kept minimized by
careful and comprehensive design and execution, but that the benefits of the controls
have also been modest.13
Table 1. The September 1, 1998 Changes
Prior to September 1, 1998  Effective  September 1, 1999
Dealings in gold andforeign currency.
*  No restriction on foreign exchange  contracts  *  No change, except for External Account holders.
between authorised dealers and non-residents.
External Accounts
*  Transfer between External Account  holders  *  Transfers  between External Accounts  require prior approval for any amount.
freely allowed.  *  Transfers  to resident accounts in Malaysia banks are permitted until 30 September 1998.
*  No restrictions on credits and debits to an  Thereafter, such transfers require approval.
External Account.  *  Sources  of funding the External Account are limited to:
*  Proceeds from sale of ringgit instruments,  securities registered in Malaysia or other
assets in Malaysia.
*  Salaries, wages, commissions,  interest or dividend.
*  Sale of foreign currency.
*  Use of ftmds in the account is limited to:
*  Purchase of ringgit assets in Malaysia.
General Payments
*  Generally residents were freely allowed to  *  Generally residents are freely allowed to make payments to non-residents for any purpose up to
make payments to non-residents  for any  RMIO,000  in ringgit or its equivalent  in foreign currency (reduction in amount), except for all
purpose, provided, for an amount  of  payment for imports of goods and services
RMIOO,O00  and above :-  *  Residents  are freely allowed to make  payments to non-residents in foreign currency only, for
*  a Form P is completed; and  amounts  exceeding RM  IO,000 equivalent. However, investments abroad in any form and payments
*  the resident does not have any domestic  under a guarantee for non-trade purposes require approval.
borrowing (if the payment is for investments  *  Form P is completed for amounts exceeding  RMI 0,000 equivalent.
abroad in any form); or
*  the payment is made in foreign currency if in
relation or consequential  to a guarantee (for
non-trade purposes).14
Export of goods
*  Prescribed manner  of payment for exports  *  Prescribed manner of payment for exports is in foreign currency only.
is in foreign  currency or ringgit from an
External Account.
Credit  facilities to non-residents
*  Non-resident  correspondent  banks and non-  *  Domestic credit facilities to non-resident correspondent banks and non-resident stockbroking companies
resident  stockbroking  companies were  are no longer  allowed.
permitted to obtain  credit facilities in aggregate
up to RM5 million from banking institutions to
fund mismatch of receipts and payments
through their External  Accounts.
Investments abroad
*  Residents with no domestic  borrowing were  *  Residents  with no domestic borrowing are allowed to make payment to non-residents for purposes of
allowed to make  payment to non-residents for  investing  abroad, up to an amount of RM10,000 or its equivalent in foreign currency per transaction
purposes  of investing  abroad  *  All residents require prior approval  to make payments to non-residents for purposes of investing abroad,
*  Corporate residents  with domestic borrowing  for an amount exceeding  RM  IO,000 equivalent in foreign currency
were allowed  to invest abroad up to the
equivalent  of RM  IO million  per calendar on a
corporate group basis
Foreign currency credit  facilities  and ringgit credit
facilities from non-residents
*  Residents  were allowed  to obtain ringgit credit  *  Residents  are not allowed  to obtain ringgit credit facilities from any non-resident individuals.
facilities of below RMIOO,000  in the aggregate
from any non-resident  individuals15
Securities
*  There was no restriction  on the secondary  *  Ringgit securities  are required to be deposited with authorised depositaries.
trading of securities  registered in Malaysia,  *  Ringgit securities  held by non-residents  must be transacted through an authorised depositary for good
between  residents and non-residents,  and  delivery. (see CLOB  shares below)
between non-residents  and non-residents.  *  All payments by non-residents  for any security  registered in Malaysia must be made in foreign currency or
*  For transfer of securities  registered outside  in ringgit from an External  Account.
Malaysia  from non-resident  to a resident, the  *  All proceeds in ringgit  received by a non-resident from the sale of any resident security must be retained
resident  was subject to the rules on investments  in an External  Account (subject to the conditions on such accounts). However, should the ringgit security
abroad.  be held for more  than one year, proceeds from the sale of such securities can be:
*  Immediately  converted to foreign currency; or
*  Credited to the Extemal Account.
*  All payments to residents for any security  registered outside Malaysia from non-residents, must be
made in foreign currency.
Import and export of currency notes, bills of
exchange, assurance  policies, etc.
*  A traveller (resident and non-resident)  was  *  A resident traveler  is permitted to import:
freely allowed  to import or export any amount  *  Ringgit notes up to RMl,000 only; and
of ringgit notes or foreign currency  notes,  *  any amount of foreign currencies.
which are on his person or in his baggage.  *  A resident traveller is permitted to export:
*  Export of foreign currencies requires approval  *  ringgit notes up to RMI ,000 only; and
*  Authorised  dealers were allowed  to import any  *  any amount of foreign currencies  up to the equivalent of RM 10,000.
amount of ringgit notes, subject to reporting on  *  A non-resident  traveler is permitted  to import:
a monthly  basis to Bank Negara Malaysia  *  Ringgit notes up to RM1,000 only;  and
*  Any amount of foreign currencies.
*  A non-resident traveler is permitted to export:
*  Ringgit notes up to RMI ,000 only;  and
*  foreign currencies up to the amount of foreign currencies brought into Malaysia
*  Prior approval is required for the import and export  of ringgit notes and the export of foreign currency
notes, other than as permitted above.
*  Transitional provision:  Up to 30 September 1998,  permission is given to a traveler (resident and non-
resident) to import  any amount of ringgit on his person or in his baggage.
CLOB  Shares
*  Trading in Malaysian shares in the Singapore's *  Enforcement  of the registration  law effectively freezes CLOB share transactions.
over-the-counter market was possible because
the law requiring shares to be registered in the
KLSE was not strictly enforced16
Labuan International Offshore Financial Centre
*  Licensed  Offshore Banks were allowed to trade  *  Licensed Offshore Banks are no longer  allowed to trade in ringgit instrument
in ringgit investments  up to permitted limits.
Table 2: Changes Made after September 1, 1998
September 2, 1999
*  The Ringgit is fixed at 3.8 to the dollar, which was close to the range it had been trading in for the previous few days.
February  15, 1999
*  The one year waiting period on conversion  of portfolio investment  is replaced with a system of graduated levies depending on the holding period. For
repatriated  principal the levies are related to holding periods as follows: Up to 7 months 30%; 7 to 9 months 20%; 9 to 12 months 10% more than 12 months
0%. Interest dividends, rental income and proceeds of real estate transactions  attract no exit levy. For repatriated profits the levy is 30% for profits repatriated
within 12 months and 10  percent thereafter.
February 18, 1999
*  Exit levies on the Second Board stocks (the technology heavy MESDAQ) are dropped.
March 1, 1999
*  Relaxation of import and export of ringgit from RM  1,000  to 10,000  for traders at certain border stations.
September 1, 1999
*  The graduated levy system  set up n February expires meaning that only investments  made since September 1, 1998 are subject to the 10% exit tax on capital
gains.
September 21, 1999
*  Investments made between September 1, 1998 and February 14, 1999 are exempted from the 10% exit levy on principal.
February 14, 2000
*  Agreement reached on a phased reintroduction  of CLOB share trade and opening the of individual security accounts with the Malaysian Central Depository.17
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